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THE EXPULSION POWERS OF CONGRESS:
JUSTICIABLE OR NOT

This inquiry is concerned ultimately with one question. If either
House of the United States Congress, purporting to act under Article
1, Section 5, of the United States Constitution, were to expel a member, would that member be able to seek judicial redress in a court
of law? Or, to put the question differently, would such expulsion
ever, under any circumstances, present a justiciable controversy?
There appears to be no precedent on this particular issue, although
at least two cases have referred to the question in a collateral manner.1
One thing is certain; when Congress moves to exclude a Mem2
ber-elect while purporting to act under its constitutional powers,
there are some instances when an attempted exclusion will present a justiciable controversy. 3
A most cursory examination of Powell v. McCormack4 will re5
veal that exclusion and expulsion are not fungible proceedings.
Yet the Court's reasoning in Powell, the latest Supreme Court pronouncement on the exclusion powers of Congress, would appear to
provide considerable enlightenment as to whether an expulsion case
might similarly admit to judicial resolution.
Before reaching the rather delicate question of whether an expulsion proceeding falls within the confines of the political question
doctrine, and thus beyond the scope of judicial review, it would be
prudent to first determine whether there are any other bars to a
suit by an expelled member of Congress seeking reinstatement. The
Powell case would appear to aid in making these determinations.
At this point some background on the Powell decision is necessary.
Adam Clayton Powell was duly elected to the House of Representatives of the 90th Congress from the Eighteenth Congressional
District of New York State. Powell met the standing requirements
of the Constitution as to age, citizenship, and residency. 6 The
1. Powell v. McCornack, 395 U.S. 486, 553 (Douglas J., concurring) (1969); In re
Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669-70 (1897).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
3. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 506-7.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 states: "No person shall be a representative who shall
not have attained to the Agei of twenty-five years and been Seven Years a Citizen of the
United States, and who shall not, when elected, be ar%Inhabitant of that State in which
he shal be chosen."
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House found that Powell had been guilty of "misconduct" having
been in contempt of the courts of New York, as well as having improperly maintained his wife on his payroll when she apparently
had no duties to perform. Having so decided, the House excluded
7
Powell by a majority vote.
DOES SPEECH OR DEBATE CLAUSE INSULATE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION OF THIS NATURE FROM JUDICIAL REVIEW
The respondents in Powell argued that the Speech or Debate
Clause 8 prohibited Powell from obtaining judicial review over the
actions of the legislators or legislative employees. The Court
rejected this contention saying that the protection afforded the members of Congress was for the purpose of enabling them to go about
their business without being forced to go to court to defend their
actions. However, the purpose of this protection was not to prevent
judicial review of the legislative action itself. 9 Thus the Court
adopted the method it had applied in a number of other cases ° where
the Court dismissed the action against members of Congress but
did not take the Speech or Debate Clause as a prohibition of a
review of the merits of the congressional action in question."
Considering the above language, it seems clear that an expelled
member of Congress would also not be barred by the Speech or Debate Clause from obtaining judicial review of his ouster. He could
bring his action against one of the congressional employees such
as the Sergeant-at-Arms, as Powell was able to do.' 2
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
In the Powell case the respondents attempted to gain dismissal
of Powell's claim by asserting that it did not amount to a case
"arising under" the Constitution within the meaning of Article III,
Section 2, which mandates that the ". . . judicial Power shall extend
to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution." . . .
Citing several cases in support of its position, 3 the Court in
Powell stated that it has long been held that a case "arises under"
the Constitution if a suit will be sustained if the Constitution.
7. H.R. Res. 278, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 states: "The Senators and Representatives ...
for
any Speech or Debate in either House, . . . shall not be questioned in any other Place."
9. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 506-7 (1969).
10. See Dumbrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967) ; Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S.
168 (1880).
11. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 506 (1969).
12. Id. at 506, 550.
13. E. g. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 685 (1946) ; King County v. Seattle Sc*'ool Dist.
No. 1, 263 U.S. 361, 363, 864 (1923) ; Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
737 (1824).

NOTES

[is] given one construction and will be defeated if it [is] given
another. 14
Powell met the test inasmuch as the success of his case rested
on the interpretation the Court gave Article 1, Section 5. Obviously,
a member of Congress seeking judicial review of his expulsion would
also meet this test. His success or failure would depend at least
in part upon the breadth of congressional powers under Article 1,
Section 5, Clause 2, as construed by the Court.
STANDING
Before anyone can bring a claim before any court, it is said
that he must have standing to do so. The court in the case of Baker
v. Carr15 concisely stated what the requirements of standing consist
of. There the court stated:
Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon
which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions? This is the gist of the question
of standing. 16
It is difficult to imagine anyone who would be in a better position
to contest an expulsion proceeding than the one expelled by it. He
would certainly have a "personal stake in the outcome of the controversy," for his seat in Congress would depend upon the judicial
decision.
CONGRESSIONAL OPINION
Before proceeding with an analysis of the applicability of the
concept of justiciability to an expulsion proceedings, it would be helpful to clarify some confusing statements made by Congressmen in
reference to the power of exclusion. Upon occasions, Congressmen
have made statements to the effect that Congress's power to expel
is plenary. Representative Gerald Ford, during the Powell hearings,
stated:
Unfortunately, during the course of this debate, statements
have been made which would indicate, if not challenged,
that this Congress has the power to exclude17 a Member14. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 512-3 (1969), citing, Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 685 (1946).
15. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
16. Id. at 204.
17. Although Ford's statement refers to exclusion, it is obvious that anyone who believes Congre S's exclusion powers to be plenary, would also take the same position as to
Congress's expulsion powers.
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elect only if such Member-elect does not satisfy the three
constitutional qualifications [of age, citizenship and inhabitancy.] I do not believe that the historical record. . . support this conclusion.' 8
One writer states that Ford's attitude is typical 9 and cites
previous instances of similar statements to support his conclusion-"
However, what Congress thinks its powers of expulsion to be, is not
dispositive of the issue. The House obviously thought it could exclude Powell, but the Court, on the facts of the case, ruled otherwise.
Conversely, there are statements by committees and individuals
that the Congressional power to expel is limited. This issue has
arisen when Congress has debated whether it can expel a member for misconduct committed prior to the convening of the Congress
which is considering expelling him. The Report of the Judiciary
Committee which concerned the expulsion of William S. King and
John G. Schumaker concluded:
Your committee are of the opinion that the House of Representatives has no authority to take jurisdiction of violations
of law or offenses committed against a previous Congress
.... [The] Constitution authorizes ". . .each house to determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrance of two-thirds,
expel a member.". . .It [expulsion power of Constitution]
cannot vest in Congress jurisdiction to try a member for an
offense committed before his election:. .. 21
In another instance, Speaker Carlisle declared that the House
had "no right" to punish a member for any offense alleged to
have been committed prior to the time of his election. Carlisle
further asserted "...
that it is no longer a matter of dispute in
' 22
the House. "
The use of words such as "no authority" and "no right" immediately raises the question as to what force is so limiting Congress
in its power to expel a member. The word "right" used in a legal
sense usually denotes the existence of an appropriate remedy to uphold the right. Of course, it is entirely possible that Carlisle, in
using the word "right" was applying a less technical meaning to
the word, and in fact meant that it would not be a nice thing to do.
18. 113 CONG. REc. H. 1940 (daily ed., March 1, 1967).
19. Dionisoyoulos, A Commentary On The Constitutional Issues In The Powell And
Related Cases, 17 J. PuB. L. 103, 121-2 (1968).
20. Id. at 122 n.49. The debates in the Berger case, 58 CONG. REC. (1919) ; the statement by Alben Barkley, 87 CoNG. REc. 3 (1941); and in 88 CONG. REC. 2475 (1942) ; the
statement of Senator George, 88 CONG. REc. 2390 (1942) ; and the statement of Senator
Ferguson, 93 CONG. REc. 74 (1947).
21. H.I. PLIP. No. 815,' 44th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1876).
22. H.R. REP. No. 30, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1925).

NOTE

It is more probable, however, 23 that statements issuing from committees or individuals to the effect that the Congress is limited in
its power to expel, actually refer to a self-imposed limitation in
the form of a manual of rules of procedure.2 4 The violation of its
own rules by a branch of Congress will not, however, give rise
to a judicial controversy if it occurs in an area where Congress is
given complete powers to act; e. g., if Congress is given plenary
powers to expel.
JUSTICIABILITY
In order that a litigant may obtain judicial relief he must present what is termed a justiciable controversy. The main question
would appear to be: Is the claim presented and the relief sought
the type which will admit of judicial resolution?
In the Baker case the Court pointed out that to determine this
type of question a court must ascertain whether ". . . the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially...
25
molded."
The Court found this aspect of justiciability to present no problem under the facts of the Powell case. It was pointed out that if
the petitioners were correct the House would have a duty to seat
Powell once it had been established that he met the standing qualifications laid down in the Constitution.2 6 Similarly, in the case of a
Congressman who was expelled, if it could be successfully argued
that he was wrongfully expelled, that branch of Congress would
have a duty to reinstate him.
A further question was brought to the fore in the Powell decision in regard to the appropriateness of coercive relief. It was
asserted that the Speech or Debate Clause would be a bar to the
issuance by a federal court of mandamus or an injunction. However, the Court found that it was not necessary to reach this question inasmuch as Powell sought a declaratory judgement 2 which
28
could be granted.
An expelled member of Congress seeking to litigate the legality
of his expulsion would also be able to avoid the problem of coercive
relief. A declaratory judgment requires only that there be a "live
dispute between the parties, ' 29 which would certainly be in exist23. This is the inevitable conclusion one must reach if he takes the position that there
is no constitutional limitation on Congress's power to expel.
24. Cf. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 509 (1969).
25. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
26. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 517 (1969).
27. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 220,1 (1964). The Act provides that a district court may

- ...

declare the rights of any interested party ... whether or not fur-

ther relief is sought."
28. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969).
29. Id. at 518, citing, Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
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ence in litigation between a branch of Congress and an expelled
member of that branch. And as the Act provides,° and the courts
have held,31 declaratory relief is available even if no other relief is.
Up to this point it is clear that there would be no bar to a suit
by an expelled Congressman contesting his expulsion. However, there
are difficult issues yet to be resolved. In an attempt to arrive at
an answer it would be prudent to construct a hypothetical situation
that would present the question of justiciability of an expulsion proceeding in perhaps its most difficult light. Suppose the House explicitly states that it expelled Member-X because X stated that
Communism is good. X seeks to have a court reinstate him, claiming a violation of his First Amendment rights of freedom of speech.
The situation appears to present a clear violation of First Amendment rights. However, given the context of an expulsion proceeding,
would be a justiciable controversy exist under the facts of the hypothetical case?
3 2
In the case of In Re Chapman,
the Court stated that "[t]he
right to expel extends to all cases where the offense is such as in
the judgment of the Senate, is inconsistent with the trust and duty
of a member.3 3 However, Chapman dealt with the constitutionality
of an act of Congress which made one subject to criminal prosecution
for refusal to answer any pertinent questions while appearing before
either House of Congress.3 4 Therefore, any pronouncements made
in regard to the expulsion powers of Congress are dicta and not
entitled to the force of precedent.
Mr. Justice Douglas has also gone on record indicating his
position that an expulsion case would not be justiciable. In his concurring opinion in the Powell case, Douglas stated, "And if this were
an expulsion case I would think that no justiciable controversy
3 5
were presented, the vote of the House being two-thirds or more.
Assuming a case would arise where a Congressman claimed he
was expelled in violation of his First Amendment rights, would the
court, as Justice Douglas indicates, refuse to hear the case? It appears to be clear that Douglas believes an expulsion would present
a political question, a second aspect of justiciability. Thus, in order
to determine the correctness of Justice Douglas's position it is necessary to ascertain, if possible, what a political question is.

30. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1964).
81. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969); accord, United Pub. Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93 (1947).
32. 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
33. Id. at 669-70.
34. Id. at 667.
35. 395 U.S. 486, 553 (Douglas J. concurring).
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POLITICAL QUESTION
To date, the court in Baker v. Carr,"' which pointed out that
the political question is primarily a result of the separation of
powers concept,3 7 seems to have formulated the most precise definition of a political question. There the court stated:
Prominant on the surface of any case held to involve a
political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political
department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a
court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question. 8
Presumably the existence of any one of these six factors would
be sufficient to invoke the political question doctrine. In the Powell
decision the court disposed of five of those aspects, exclusing the
"textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" factor, in a
very cursory manner.3 9 Applying the same method of analysis to
an expulsion case, it would appear that four of the factors enumerated in Baker, exclusive of the "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment" and the "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" factors, be similarly disposed of in a summary manner. However, the two excluded factors would present
very serious obstacles to any claim that an expulsion proceeding
would ever present a justiciable controversy.
Textually Demonstrable Constitutional Commitment
An expelled member of Congress, to be successful in obtaining
judicial review of his case, would have to persuade a court that
the power of expulsion has not been constitutionally committed to
Congress. One of the avenues of approach to aid one in making the
determination as to what the writers of the Constitution intended on
this question is to examine the historical background of the Con40
stitutional Convention. In Powell, the court utilized this method.
For whatever weight such facts are entitled to be given, the
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Id. at 210.
Id. at 217.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548-9
Id. at 548-9.

(1969).
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British historical precedents seem to support an unlimited power to
expel. One example is that of the expulsion of a Doctor Parry for
unspecified behavior. 41 And, in 1628, Sir Edmond Sawyer was expelled for attempting to suppress evidence against Sir Edmond in
testimony before the House. 42 It might be argued with some force,
that the framers of the United States Constitution were aware of
the British precedents indicating complete freedom to expel and
intended the same to be the case in this country also.
In reaching its decision in the Powell case that exclusion was
limited to the standing qualifications enumerated in the Constitution,
the Court relied to some extent on Charles Warren's records of the
Constitutional Convention. 43 It was pointed out that Madison had
observed that the right of expulsion was too important to be exercised by a majority of a quorum, which would present a possibility
that a particular faction of Congress might be abused. Madison
therefore moved, and the Convention nearly unanimously adopted the
44
motion, that a two-thirds vote be required for expulsion.
From this the Court in Powell concluded that inasmuch as the
Convention decided that the importance of expulsion required a twothirds vote, while exclusion required only a majority vote, exclusion
was apparently intended to be limited to grounds specified in the
Constitution.4 5 In addition, Madison's statement as to the importance
of the expulsion power, 6 is rather compelling evidence that the
writers of the Constitution intended that the expulsion powers of
47
Congress be unlimited.
Such a conclusion would also seem to be the logical deduction
to be made from the Court's reasoning in Powell. The majority states
that in their opinion, the history of the Constitutional Convention reveals the Convention's intention that exclusion be limited to those
instances where a Member-elect fails to meet the specific Constutional requirements. The Court says this must be so because the
Convention required a two-thirds vote for an expulsion, while not
41. A Complete Journal of the Votes, Speeches and Debates of the House of Lords
and House of Commons Throughout the Whole Reign of Queen Elizabeth of Glorious
Memory, 352 Cb. Ewes ed. (1708), as cited in, Powell v. McCormack 395 U.S. 486, 542
n.48.
42. L.H.C. Jour. 917, as cited in, Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 524. n.48.
43.

C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE

ONSTITUTION

(1928).

44. Id. at 424.
45. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547-8 (1969).
46. Supra note 43, at 424.
47. See generally for support of this conclusion: WARREN, supra note 43, at 4.20-24.
This contention becomes all the stronger when one is made aware, as Warren points out,
that Madison's statement Was made the same day as and in reference to, a discussion,
the result of which was to require only a majority vote for exclusion. During this discussion Madison, in reference to the limitations to be set on qualifiaations to sit in Congress, remarked,
...
the British Parliament possessed the power of regulating the qualifications . . . of the elected and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our
attention."
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similarly restricting the power of exclusion. 48 Thus, is not the
Court in Powell, strongly implying that the power to expel is not
in any manner restricted?
Secondly, following the approach of the court in Powell, construction of pertinent provisions of the Constitution would be as essential in making the determination as to the constutional commitment
of an expulsion proceeding to Congress. In Powell, the Court additionally based its decision on construction of pertinent provisions
of the Constitution. The Court read the language of Article 1, Section 5, which relevant part reads, "Each House shall be the Judge
of the Election, Returns, and Qualifications of its own members
. ... " in conjunction with requirements laid down in Article 1,
Section 2, Clause 2, as to "age, citizenship, and inhabitancy." Thus,
the Court was able to conclude, with some logic, that inasmuch as
Section 5 speaks of judging "Elections, Returns, and Qualification,"
and Section 2 specifically states what qualifications one must possess
to be eligible for election, Article 1, Section 5, is limited by Article 1,
4
Section 2, Clause 2. 9
However, it does not appear that Article 1, Section 5, Clause
2, can be similarly read in conjunction with any other provision of
the Constitution in a manner as to limit its applicability. The section reads in full:
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the
Concurrence of two-thirds, expel a Member.
This provision may be saying that Congress can expel, period;
or, it may be saying that Congress can expel for "disorderly behavior." If the section gives Congress blanket power to expell for
whatever reason it chooses, any claim seeking judicial relief for
such expulsion would summarily be disposed of as a political question.
Contentiously, however, Article 1, Section 5, Clause 2, when read
as a whole, empowers Congress to expel a member only in cases
where that member has been guilty of disorderly behavior. If this
position were to be taken it could then be argued that the issue has
not been constitutionally committeed to Congress by making the
assertion that a court could inquire into Congress's determination
as to what constitutes disorderly behavior. Admittedly this involves
a somewhat strained reading, inasmuch as Article 1, Section 5, Clause
2, would in effect be read to say Congress may expel for disorderly
behavior, but the courts may determine what constitutes disorderly
48.
49.

See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969),
Id.
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behavior. However, even assuming the correctness of this possibly
untenable position, it would still appear that a court would be precluded from rendering a decision on the legality of an expulsion proceeding.
In Powell, the court noted that even if it were definite that Congress's powers to judge the qualifications of its Members-elect were
limited to the standing qualifications of the Constitution, a non-justiciable political question might still be presented. The problem didn't
arise in the case because the respondents admitted that Powell met
the standing qualifications, 50 but the Court noted:
Consistent with this interpretation, federal courts might still
be barred by the political question doctrine from reviewing
the House's factual determination that a member did not
meet one of the standing qualifications. This is an issue not
presented in this case and we express no view as to its

resolution .51
By raising this point, the Court in Powell seems to imply that at
least an arguable issue would be presented under such facts. If it
could be so argued in an exclusion case, where the grounds for
exclusion are explicitly enumerated, and a factual determination
as to whether one has met these qualifications would be relatively
simple to make, would not such an argument be of overwhelming
persuasiveness in an expulsion situation?
It would be at this point that another of the incidents of a political
question enumerated in Baker, that of "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving an issue,5 2 would
present itself. Disorderly behavior is indeed a very nebulous term.
Where are the "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
for determining what disorderly behavior is? Clearly there are none.
There are no constitutional guidelines as to what constitutes disorderly
behavior, as there are constitutional guidelines on the grounds for
exclusion.
CONCLUSION
It appears very clear that Congress is given plenary powers to
expel a Member-elect. Even though a court viewed with horror a
particular expulsion proceeding, it would decline to rule on the case.
By hearing such a case a court would be exposing itself to a myraid
of difficulties, for which the standards of resolution would be amorphous at best.
TERRY C. HOLTER
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 521 n.42.
369 U.S. 186, 217.

